Philosophical Thought
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CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
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Volume 6, Issue 3 (2026)
3 2026, 6(3): 1001-1015 |
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Received: 2026/09/26 | Accepted: 2026/10/2 | Published: 2026/10/2
Received: 2026/09/26 | Accepted: 2026/10/2 | Published: 2026/10/2
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Internalism and Normative Authority: A Critique of Bernard Williams and Stephen Finlay. 3 2026; 6 (3) :1001-1015
URL: http://jpt.daneshafarand.org/article-6-87245-en.html
URL: http://jpt.daneshafarand.org/article-6-87245-en.html
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Abstract (96 Views)
Internalism about normative reasons grounds moral normativity in our psychological states by positing a necessary connection between such reasons and an agent’s motivational set. Externalists reject this constraint. A central locus of this dispute concerns the interpretation and evaluation of Bernard Williams’s seminal argument for internalism.
Drawing on the work of Stephen Finlay, this article first isolates four standard readings of Williams’s argument, introduces Finlay’s own distinct interpretation, and subsequently subjects these accounts to critical scrutiny. The discussion then turns to Finlay’s broader theoretical framework. By employing contextualism and an end-relational analysis of moral concepts, Finlay attempts to decouple the "existence" of reasons from their "significance"—seeking to preserve the spirit of internalism within an externalist framework. Ultimately, the paper argues that Finlay’s account falls prey to the very same fundamental objection that plagues Williams’s view: it fails to provide an adequate account of morality's normative authority.
Drawing on the work of Stephen Finlay, this article first isolates four standard readings of Williams’s argument, introduces Finlay’s own distinct interpretation, and subsequently subjects these accounts to critical scrutiny. The discussion then turns to Finlay’s broader theoretical framework. By employing contextualism and an end-relational analysis of moral concepts, Finlay attempts to decouple the "existence" of reasons from their "significance"—seeking to preserve the spirit of internalism within an externalist framework. Ultimately, the paper argues that Finlay’s account falls prey to the very same fundamental objection that plagues Williams’s view: it fails to provide an adequate account of morality's normative authority.