Volume 2, Issue 3 (2022)                   3 2022, 2(3): 269-282 | Back to browse issues page

Print XML PDF HTML

‎ 10.58209/jpt.2.3.269

History

Received: 2022/05/18 | Accepted: 2022/08/24 | Published: 2022/09/19
Rights and permissions
Inconsistency in Science; an Argument for the Possibility of the Paraconsistent Philosophy of Science
Authors K. Farsian *
Deptartment of Philosophy and Logic, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
* Corresponding Author Address: Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Jalal Al-Ahmad and Chamran Highway Junction, Tehran, Iran. Postal Code: 1344786594 (kasrafarsian@gmail.com)
Abstract   (4694 Views)
According to some important philosophers of science, such as Popper, Hempel and Tarski, consistency is a necessary condition of establishing any scientific theory. They hold that all inconsistent scientific theories are uninformative, meaningless or deficient. In this paper I will first argue against their clams, then I consider some inconsistencies which happened at the heart of some well-accepted scientific theories (Empirical or Non-Empirical), and by this I will try to open the door for the possibility of the paraconsistent philosophy of science.
Keywords:
Paraconsistency, Philosophy of Science, Contradiction in Science, Paraconsistent Logics, Graham Priest