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Caution in Supererogation. 3 https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.4.1.61
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-73751-en.html
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-73751-en.html
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Introduction
A few years ago, in a rather small town in Iran, a 15-year-old boy entered a burning home to save two elderly women. In the end, the boy dies due to the deep burn injuries. And of the two elder women, only one survives. This is a real story, and details are reported on the news. How do you describe the agent in this situation?
You can put a milder case instead of this. Consider The Selfless Farmer (Dehqān-e Fadākār) who burnt his clothes to stop a train and save it from an accident. Alternatively, you can think of someone who uses all his retirement savings for charity. In these and similar cases, we praise the agents and evaluate their actions positively, but usually do not feel required to do the same, nor do we expect them to act in such ways. Although these cases may differ in normatively important aspects, we can include them under the title “supererogation, which is not strange to common-sense moral thinking. Furthermore, this may remind people familiar with Islam of the term mustahab.
However, supererogation is a problem. What is considered supererogatory is, on the one hand, (a) permissible, not required. However, it is (b) better than some other alternatives [Horgan & Timmons, 2010; Eslami & Archer, 2024]. However, the question is: why aren't such better options required – shouldn’t we choose the best of our options? Consider the issue in terms of reasons: if something is better than alternatives, it is because of those reasons. Plus, reasons determine what we are required to do. So, how come some options are supported by most reasons but are not required [Portmore, 2021]? It was “Saints and Heroes” by J. O. Urmson [1958] that made moral philosophers consider this problem, and today there is a wide and varied literature on the subject.
Here, I do not even try to mention the difficulties of characterizing supererogation, let alone approaches to explaining it. There are only two modest aims for this short note. First, it introduces a recent proposal to the Farsi readers. Next, it illustrates how supererogation is important to basic questions about normativity.
The Cautionary Account
In a recent paper, it is argued that Miskawayh, an 11th-century philosopher in the Islamicate world, raised a question analogous to the contemporary problem of supererogation and proposed a solution [Eslami & Archer, 2024]. The proposal draws on the notion of caution to make sense of the ways we praise those who go beyond what is just and according to the mean, between virtues and vices. The authors suggest that the solution proposed by Miskawayh can be generalized and applied to contemporary debates on the problem of supererogation.
That paper has two aspects: (a) historical and (b) philosophical. On the historical side, it is noteworthy that although the problem of supererogation is challenging for all ethical theories, some authors have argued that it is especially problematic for virtue ethics [Crisp, 2013; Heyd, 2015]. Plus, the current philosophical literature on this problem largely begins with Urmson [1958]. Against this background, Miskawayh has formulated the problem and proposed a response, all within the context of (mostly) Aristotelian virtue ethics. Furthermore, this can be taken as a clue that at least the traditional Miskawayh was aware of the problem and may have developed other reactions to it. For one, Tusi in The Nasirean Ethics (Akhlāq Nāṣerī), follows Miskawayh on this and explicitly includes the relevant passages in the text [Tusi, 1364: 145-146].
In addition, a central claim about the Cautionary Account of supererogation concerns its philosophical relevance and importance. It has some advantages compared to popular options in the literature. Among the advantages is the ability to accommodate small acts of supererogation [Ferry, 2013]. Meanwhile, the account also faces challenges and may be revisionary to some degree at times. Be that as it may, it is an option worthy of further work. In this note, instead of further discussing the account [Eslami & Archer, 2024], I emphasize the importance of exploring supererogation as an essential part of studying normativity.
Escaping The Supererogation
Note that different questions about supererogation need to be distinguished –definition, possibility, kinds, explanation, extension, phenomenology, and others. For example, one can ask about supererogation regarding oneself [Kawall, 2003]. Another question may be about supererogation in the epistemic domain [Hajighasemi, 2023]. Still, some are skeptical about the very idea. Skeptical attempts are to be considered.
There are ways to avoid explaining supererogation and instead explain the phenomena in question using the already available ethical theories, without introducing the supererogatory and dealing with its problems. Considering the difficulties, escaping such attempts may be a good theoretical option indeed, if possible.
For example, perhaps we can explain the alleged cases of supererogation by appealing to (i) professional duties, (ii) the differences in our abilities (psychological, cognitive, etc.), or (iii) differences in character. Such ideas may be used to explain why alleged acts of supererogation are not required of us all, while they may be required of some people. Yet another option is to take a more radical stance by (iv) rejecting the primary judgments about such cases. Then, the boy may have been mistaken in taking the risk. This move would need to address questions of blameworthiness as well.
I think such attempts are unsuccessful. They cannot eliminate the need for supererogation. Meanwhile, these attempts are very worthwhile. It is important to use the resources of our ethical theories as much as possible and not unnecessarily inflate the phenomena to be explained. Then we can better inquire into the supererogatory. This matters because it is a window into broader questions about normativity.
Importance of Supererogation
The way we think about supererogation is important even for our everyday lives. Supererogation is not limited to the dramatic cases of saving people from fire and giving all one’s properties to charities. As noted, there are small acts of supererogation. Plus, just as an example, we need to decide how much we contribute to charities and pay our dues, morally speaking. More theoretically, supererogation comes up in the course of evaluating ethical theories. This is clearer in the case of, say, classical utilitarianism, which (according to a common objection) does not leave room for supererogation.
But there is another way that supererogation is important as well. Attempts to deal with supererogation raise questions that are important to inquiries into normativity. Similarly, supererogation is a central kind of example for making sense of some views. Let’s briefly review these three: (a) kinds of normativity, (b) priority of the moral, and (c) the kinds of weights of reasons.
Consider (a) kinds of normativity. Normative evaluation is not only moral. There are normative domains that are not morally important [Miller 1398]. For example, there are athletic norms as well as norms of etiquette. Now, think of a proposal to the effect that supererogation is about moral normativity only and does not require an overall judgment. The supererogatory act is morally better than all options, but is not overall better. This explains why the supererogatory act is not required. The next step would be to ask how the moral is distinguished and characterized, and whether we can come to overall judgments when comparing reasons of different kinds [Portmore, 2021: section 2.2].
Next, (b) the question of priority. One tempting answer to the question of “What distinguishes moral normativity from other kinds of normativity?” appeals to the idea of priority. According to this answer, moral normativity is always the overriding one and comes first. There are different ways to understand the idea of priority [Gert, 2013]. Be that as it may, it seems that supererogation provides easy and simple cases against the idea of priority of the moral – in such cases, we do not follow moral reasons to the best.
Finally, (c) kinds of weight of reasons. Reasons have weights; this is among the main aspects of them to be accounted for [Scanlon, 2014]. Thanks to cases such as supererogation, one might wonder about the different weights each reason may have. One influential proposal in this regard is to distinguish between justifying weight and requiring weight [Gert, 2003]. Then, according to the proposal, we have additional tools to distinguish moral normativity from other normative theories. Accordingly, it may be that only moral reasons require weight, although at times nonmoral reasons may take priority in terms of justifying weight.
In all this, I do not mean to endorse or challenge ideas. The aim is to see how the problem of supererogation is well-connected with broader questions about normativity.
Conclusion
This note introduces a neglected resource for discussions of supererogation: Miskawayh's ethical treatise, Refinement of Character (Tahdhīb al-akhlāq). This is followed by general remarks about the importance of supererogation for ethical theory and normativity studies.
A few years ago, in a rather small town in Iran, a 15-year-old boy entered a burning home to save two elderly women. In the end, the boy dies due to the deep burn injuries. And of the two elder women, only one survives. This is a real story, and details are reported on the news. How do you describe the agent in this situation?
You can put a milder case instead of this. Consider The Selfless Farmer (Dehqān-e Fadākār) who burnt his clothes to stop a train and save it from an accident. Alternatively, you can think of someone who uses all his retirement savings for charity. In these and similar cases, we praise the agents and evaluate their actions positively, but usually do not feel required to do the same, nor do we expect them to act in such ways. Although these cases may differ in normatively important aspects, we can include them under the title “supererogation, which is not strange to common-sense moral thinking. Furthermore, this may remind people familiar with Islam of the term mustahab.
However, supererogation is a problem. What is considered supererogatory is, on the one hand, (a) permissible, not required. However, it is (b) better than some other alternatives [Horgan & Timmons, 2010; Eslami & Archer, 2024]. However, the question is: why aren't such better options required – shouldn’t we choose the best of our options? Consider the issue in terms of reasons: if something is better than alternatives, it is because of those reasons. Plus, reasons determine what we are required to do. So, how come some options are supported by most reasons but are not required [Portmore, 2021]? It was “Saints and Heroes” by J. O. Urmson [1958] that made moral philosophers consider this problem, and today there is a wide and varied literature on the subject.
Here, I do not even try to mention the difficulties of characterizing supererogation, let alone approaches to explaining it. There are only two modest aims for this short note. First, it introduces a recent proposal to the Farsi readers. Next, it illustrates how supererogation is important to basic questions about normativity.
The Cautionary Account
In a recent paper, it is argued that Miskawayh, an 11th-century philosopher in the Islamicate world, raised a question analogous to the contemporary problem of supererogation and proposed a solution [Eslami & Archer, 2024]. The proposal draws on the notion of caution to make sense of the ways we praise those who go beyond what is just and according to the mean, between virtues and vices. The authors suggest that the solution proposed by Miskawayh can be generalized and applied to contemporary debates on the problem of supererogation.
That paper has two aspects: (a) historical and (b) philosophical. On the historical side, it is noteworthy that although the problem of supererogation is challenging for all ethical theories, some authors have argued that it is especially problematic for virtue ethics [Crisp, 2013; Heyd, 2015]. Plus, the current philosophical literature on this problem largely begins with Urmson [1958]. Against this background, Miskawayh has formulated the problem and proposed a response, all within the context of (mostly) Aristotelian virtue ethics. Furthermore, this can be taken as a clue that at least the traditional Miskawayh was aware of the problem and may have developed other reactions to it. For one, Tusi in The Nasirean Ethics (Akhlāq Nāṣerī), follows Miskawayh on this and explicitly includes the relevant passages in the text [Tusi, 1364: 145-146].
In addition, a central claim about the Cautionary Account of supererogation concerns its philosophical relevance and importance. It has some advantages compared to popular options in the literature. Among the advantages is the ability to accommodate small acts of supererogation [Ferry, 2013]. Meanwhile, the account also faces challenges and may be revisionary to some degree at times. Be that as it may, it is an option worthy of further work. In this note, instead of further discussing the account [Eslami & Archer, 2024], I emphasize the importance of exploring supererogation as an essential part of studying normativity.
Escaping The Supererogation
Note that different questions about supererogation need to be distinguished –definition, possibility, kinds, explanation, extension, phenomenology, and others. For example, one can ask about supererogation regarding oneself [Kawall, 2003]. Another question may be about supererogation in the epistemic domain [Hajighasemi, 2023]. Still, some are skeptical about the very idea. Skeptical attempts are to be considered.
There are ways to avoid explaining supererogation and instead explain the phenomena in question using the already available ethical theories, without introducing the supererogatory and dealing with its problems. Considering the difficulties, escaping such attempts may be a good theoretical option indeed, if possible.
For example, perhaps we can explain the alleged cases of supererogation by appealing to (i) professional duties, (ii) the differences in our abilities (psychological, cognitive, etc.), or (iii) differences in character. Such ideas may be used to explain why alleged acts of supererogation are not required of us all, while they may be required of some people. Yet another option is to take a more radical stance by (iv) rejecting the primary judgments about such cases. Then, the boy may have been mistaken in taking the risk. This move would need to address questions of blameworthiness as well.
I think such attempts are unsuccessful. They cannot eliminate the need for supererogation. Meanwhile, these attempts are very worthwhile. It is important to use the resources of our ethical theories as much as possible and not unnecessarily inflate the phenomena to be explained. Then we can better inquire into the supererogatory. This matters because it is a window into broader questions about normativity.
Importance of Supererogation
The way we think about supererogation is important even for our everyday lives. Supererogation is not limited to the dramatic cases of saving people from fire and giving all one’s properties to charities. As noted, there are small acts of supererogation. Plus, just as an example, we need to decide how much we contribute to charities and pay our dues, morally speaking. More theoretically, supererogation comes up in the course of evaluating ethical theories. This is clearer in the case of, say, classical utilitarianism, which (according to a common objection) does not leave room for supererogation.
But there is another way that supererogation is important as well. Attempts to deal with supererogation raise questions that are important to inquiries into normativity. Similarly, supererogation is a central kind of example for making sense of some views. Let’s briefly review these three: (a) kinds of normativity, (b) priority of the moral, and (c) the kinds of weights of reasons.
Consider (a) kinds of normativity. Normative evaluation is not only moral. There are normative domains that are not morally important [Miller 1398]. For example, there are athletic norms as well as norms of etiquette. Now, think of a proposal to the effect that supererogation is about moral normativity only and does not require an overall judgment. The supererogatory act is morally better than all options, but is not overall better. This explains why the supererogatory act is not required. The next step would be to ask how the moral is distinguished and characterized, and whether we can come to overall judgments when comparing reasons of different kinds [Portmore, 2021: section 2.2].
Next, (b) the question of priority. One tempting answer to the question of “What distinguishes moral normativity from other kinds of normativity?” appeals to the idea of priority. According to this answer, moral normativity is always the overriding one and comes first. There are different ways to understand the idea of priority [Gert, 2013]. Be that as it may, it seems that supererogation provides easy and simple cases against the idea of priority of the moral – in such cases, we do not follow moral reasons to the best.
Finally, (c) kinds of weight of reasons. Reasons have weights; this is among the main aspects of them to be accounted for [Scanlon, 2014]. Thanks to cases such as supererogation, one might wonder about the different weights each reason may have. One influential proposal in this regard is to distinguish between justifying weight and requiring weight [Gert, 2003]. Then, according to the proposal, we have additional tools to distinguish moral normativity from other normative theories. Accordingly, it may be that only moral reasons require weight, although at times nonmoral reasons may take priority in terms of justifying weight.
In all this, I do not mean to endorse or challenge ideas. The aim is to see how the problem of supererogation is well-connected with broader questions about normativity.
Conclusion
This note introduces a neglected resource for discussions of supererogation: Miskawayh's ethical treatise, Refinement of Character (Tahdhīb al-akhlāq). This is followed by general remarks about the importance of supererogation for ethical theory and normativity studies.
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