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A critique on the belief of Wonder: the beginning of philosophy and arguing for Surprise: the origin of abductive inference. 3 https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.1.3.249
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-57344-en.html
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-57344-en.html
Abstract: (4126 Views)
The article’s main aim is to investigate the relationship between wonder and philosophical thoughts and between surprise and abductive thoughts. We critique the Platonic belief that philosophy begins from wonder and argue that the explanatory and normalizing function of knowledge in societies and naturalistic ontology neutralizes the astonishment and makes ineffective its impact on philosophical thoughts. In contrast, we argue that the genesis of philosophical thought is due to deep speculation and introspective temperament of the mind and skeptical exploration of the existing knowledge and beliefs. Abduction has been the recent research subject of various disciplines. Next, the paper is devoted to a new investigation of abductive inference, subjective abduction, and its relationship with the emotion of surprise and dramatic events. We explain this amazing mental ability regarding subjective estimation of probability and intuitive expectation. At last, some fallacies arising from abductive reasoning are discussed.
Keywords: Wonder, Normalizing Knowledge, Surprise, Abductive Inference, Intuitive Expectation, Abductive Fallacies
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