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A Solution for the Harman–MacFarlane Dispute Based on Steinberger’s Three Normative Roles of Logic. 3 https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.6.2.141
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-85696-en.html
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-85696-en.html
Abstract: (268 Views)
The theory of the normativity of logic is a fundamental issue in the philosophy of logic and epistemology that examines the role of logic in organizing beliefs and guiding everyday reasoning. Within this framework, there are serious disagreements between advocates of this theory, such as MacFarlane, and critics such as Harman. The present article, using Steinberger's distinction between the three normative roles of logic, shows that the difference between Harman and MacFarlane is largely "verbal" and is rooted in a confusion between the distinct functions of logic. However, while we accept Steinberger's claim, we argue that by making some modifications to MacFarlane's criteria for assessing the normativity of logic, his position can be changed in a way that is resistant to Harman's criticisms. In other words, with these reforms, the disagreement between Harman and MacFarlane, contrary to Steinberger's claim, will no longer be a formal disagreement, and the principles of the bridge of normative logic can be reconstructed in a way that is immune to Harman's objections.
Keywords: Harman, MacFarlane, Normativity of Logic, Bridge Principles, Steinberger, Three Normative Roles of Logic
Article Type: Original Research |
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