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3 , - : 179-195 |
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Metaphysical Explanation as “What Represents Grounding”. 3 https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.6.2.179
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-85697-en.html
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-85697-en.html
Abstract: (315 Views)
Metaphysical explanation in contemporary metaphysics faces a profound conflict between the alleged objectivity of grounding relations and the mind-dependent features of explanation. This study explores the nature of the link between grounding and explanation, aiming to resolve the "inheritance problem"—i.e., how the properties of grounding are inherited from the properties of explanation—and the resulting methodological crisis within realist accounts. To this end, two primary frameworks, "Unionism" and "Separatism," are evaluated across five distinct realist and anti-realist versions. It is argued that traditional versions of realism fail to provide a consistent account of the relationship between objective reality and epistemic access. Ultimately, "Hybrid Separatism" is introduced as the preferred solution. By distinguishing between "explanation per se" (defined as that which represents grounding) and "successful explanation" (conceived as an epistemic act), this model offers a coherent framework that preserves the metaphysical objectivity of grounding without sacrificing its essential explanatory character.
Article Type: Original Research |
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