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Volume 3, Issue 2 (2023)                   J Clin Care Skill 2023, 3(2): 101-119 | Back to browse issues page

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RahimNasirian I, Hesamifar A. Rorty vs. Davidson; a Semantic Theory Based on Truth. J Clin Care Skill 2023; 3 (2) :101-119
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-66461-en.html
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1- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran
* Corresponding Author Address: Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Imam Khomeini International University, Shahid Haj Ghasem Soleimani Boulevard, Qazvin, Iran. Postal Code: 3414896818 (i.r.nasirian@gmail.com)
Abstract   (2710 Views)
An example of Rorty's confrontation with the analytical philosophy is his opposition to Davidson's attempt to propose a semantic theory based on truth. According to an anti-metaphysical approach to Truth, Rorty believes that the use of the phrase p is true is simply to confirm a claim that we consider ourselves or others justified in making. Although Davidson is against the metaphysical approach to truth, based on a Tarskian truth definition, he believes that a notion of truth more robust than Rorty will admit is required to propose a theory about meaning. Rorty's Wittgensteinian response to Davidson is that not only the conversation between the speaker and the interpreter is not conditional on knowing a theory of meaning based on truth, but the attempt to say something more than what we can say about truth leads us to the confusions of the metaphysical tradition. This article, referring to Davidson's writings, shows that Davidson's effort to propose a semantic theory based on truth inevitably leads him to express metaphysical interpretations.

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