TMU
Owner
Tarbiat Modares University (TMU)
Volume 6, Issue 3 (2026)
3 2026, 6(3): 289-304 |
Back to browse issues page
Request Type:
History
Received: 2026/05/23 | Accepted: 2026/06/25 | Published: 2026/08/1
Received: 2026/05/23 | Accepted: 2026/06/25 | Published: 2026/08/1
How to cite this article
Alaeinejad H. Alethic Pluralism and the Problem of Mixed Discourse. 3 2026; 6 (3) :289-304
URL: http://jpt.daneshafarand.org/article-6-87240-en.html
URL: http://jpt.daneshafarand.org/article-6-87240-en.html
Download citation:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
Rights and permissions
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
Department of Logic, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran, No. 4, Shahid Arakelian Street, Nofel Loshato Street, Tehran, Iran. Postal Code: 1481611336 (alaeinejad@irip.ac.ir)
Abstract (173 Views)
Alethic pluralism maintains that truth is realized by different truth-conferring properties in different domains of discourse. A challenge for this view arises from mixed discourse: propositions and inferences that combine content from distinct domains. This paper examines the problem at three levels: mixed atomic propositions, mixed compound propositions, and mixed inferences. Its central claim is that these forms of mixed discourse are not equally problematic. Moderate versions of alethic pluralism, especially Lynch’s functionalist account, can explain mixed compounds and mixed inferences by appealing to a higher-order property of truth shared across domains. Mixed atomic propositions, however, remain resistant to such treatment because they involve cross-domain interaction at the most fundamental semantic level. The paper concludes that the ultimate viability of alethic pluralism depends on its ability to provide a convincing account of mixed atomic propositions.
Keywords: