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Journal ofPhilosophical Thought

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Volume 6, Issue 3 (2026)                   3 2026, 6(3): 341-360 | Back to browse issues page
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‎ 10.58209/jpt.6.3.341

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Received: 2026/06/16 | Accepted: 2026/08/6 | Published: 2026/09/11
How to cite this article
Dargahifar R. The Mind–Body Problem 3.0 and the Reduction of the Proper Task of Philosophy of Mind; a Critique of Jacob Nathan's View. 3 2026; 6 (3) :341-360
URL: http://jpt.daneshafarand.org/article-6-87243-en.html
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The Mind–Body Problem 3.0 and the Reduction of the Proper Task of Philosophy of Mind; a Critique of Jacob Nathan's View
Authors R. Dargahifar *
Department of Cognitive Science, Faculty of Strategic Sciences and Technologies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
* Corresponding Author Address: Faculty of Strategic Sciences and Technologies, Central Library, University of Qom, Al-Ghadeer Boulevard, Qom, Iran. Postal Code: 3716146611 (dargahifarreza@gmail.com)
Abstract   (162 Views)
Jacob Nathan argues that the mind–body problem has historically worn three different faces, and that, in light of its most recent face, the proper task of philosophy of mind in the present era is restricted to investigating how the mind can be empirically studied within the neuroscientific age, thus requiring that ontological investigations be set aside. This paper offers a reconstruction and critical evaluation of Nathan's position. An instance of the articulation of the proper task of philosophy within contemporary mind studies can be observed in the 'critical neuroscience' approach as expounded by David Låg Tomasi. Tomasi conceives of philosophy not as a peripheral discipline, but as a "Philosophy as basic approach toward neuroscience." On this account, philosophy, in its relation to neuroscience, is charged with analyzing theoretical presuppositions, interpreting empirical data, integrating various levels of explanation, and appraising the existential, ethical, and social consequences of neuroscientific research—without relinquishing its own ongoing inquiries into its characteristic problems.
 
Keywords:
Philosophy of Mind, Mind–Body Problem, Critical Neuroscience, David Låg Tomasi, Jacob Nathan, Consciousness, Philosophy of Science