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Metaphysical Explanation as “What Represents Grounding”. 3 https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.6.2.179
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-85697-en.html
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-85697-en.html
| Abstract (HTML) (313 Views)
In Defense of Hybrid Separatism
To resolve the profound conflict between the objective nature of grounding and the subjective features of explanation, "Hybrid Separatism" emerges as the most coherent methodological framework. The critical insight of this model is the systematic distinction it draws between "explanation per se" and "successful explanation" [Skiles & Trogdon, 2021; Thompson, 2023].
Explanation per se is defined objectively as a representational entity (such as a proposition or model) that aims to picture an ontic grounding relation. However, a "successful explanation" is an epistemic act. An explanation only becomes successful when it fulfills both the existential condition (an actual mind-independent grounding relation must exist) and the subjective condition (the representation must be informative and capable of generating understanding). The analytical advantages of this framework include:
Conclusion
The methodological crisis in contemporary metaphysics, epitomized by the Inheritance Problem, is not a reason to abandon metaphysical realism or retreat into explanatory idealism. Instead, it highlights the necessity of refining traditional realist frameworks. Hybrid Separatism provides the analytical path to resolving this problem. By distinguishing between "explanation as a minimal representation" and "explanation as a cognitive act of generating understanding," it prevents the mind-dependent features of explanation from infecting the objective nature of grounding. In this paradigm, the objective world and the human mind are transformed into interdependent partners. Grounding remains the objective determination relation in the world, while metaphysical explanation is elevated to a clear, representational bridge connecting mind-independent metaphysics with human epistemology.
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Introduction
Contemporary metaphysics, at its most fundamental level, is deeply intertwined with an "Explanatory Project." At the heart of this ontological inquiry lie two essential concepts: "Grounding," understood as an objective, mind-independent, and non-causal determination relation that structures reality; and "Metaphysical Explanation," which provides the cognitive framework through which this hierarchical structure is understood. The recent revival of the concept of grounding in analytic philosophy initially assumed a self-evident, tight connection between grounding and metaphysical explanation. However, this presumed unity has generated a profound theoretical and methodological crisis.
A fundamental conflict arises from the dual nature of metaphysical explanation. On one hand, it claims to describe objective, mind-independent structures of the world (metaphysical objectivity). On the other hand, any explanation—by its very nature—possesses mind-dependent, epistemic, and pragmatic features; it must provide "understanding" for a cognitive agent, possess relevance, and be intelligible. This inherent tension, first systematically articulated by Naomi Thompson [Thompson, 2016], creates the "Inheritance Problem" [Maurin, 2019]: how can the mind-dependent properties of explanation fail to infect the objective properties of grounding, or conversely, how can an entirely mind-independent relation fulfill cognitive explanatory functions? Traditional realist accounts face a methodological impasse here. To resolve this crisis and salvage metaphysical realism, it is necessary to thoroughly analyze the nature of the link between grounding and explanation.
Structural Conflict; :union:ism vs. Separatism
The core of the debate centers on a conceptual distinction between what determines a fact ontologically and what explains it. Ontic determination, or grounding, is theorized as an objective structural tie in the world itself. Conversely, metaphysical explanation is intuitively understood as a cognitive or communicative activity aimed at generating understanding.
To address the relationship between these two concepts, contemporary metaphysical literature is divided into two overarching frameworks, a terminological distinction highlighted by Michael Raven [Raven, 2015]: ":union:ism," which asserts that grounding is identical to metaphysical explanation, and "Separatism," which maintains that they are distinct entities. When evaluating these frameworks based on their ontological commitments, a complex theoretical landscape emerges, comprising five distinct models.
The theoretical landscape can be categorized into five major approaches based on how they handle the priority and distinction between grounding and explanation:
Contemporary metaphysics, at its most fundamental level, is deeply intertwined with an "Explanatory Project." At the heart of this ontological inquiry lie two essential concepts: "Grounding," understood as an objective, mind-independent, and non-causal determination relation that structures reality; and "Metaphysical Explanation," which provides the cognitive framework through which this hierarchical structure is understood. The recent revival of the concept of grounding in analytic philosophy initially assumed a self-evident, tight connection between grounding and metaphysical explanation. However, this presumed unity has generated a profound theoretical and methodological crisis.
A fundamental conflict arises from the dual nature of metaphysical explanation. On one hand, it claims to describe objective, mind-independent structures of the world (metaphysical objectivity). On the other hand, any explanation—by its very nature—possesses mind-dependent, epistemic, and pragmatic features; it must provide "understanding" for a cognitive agent, possess relevance, and be intelligible. This inherent tension, first systematically articulated by Naomi Thompson [Thompson, 2016], creates the "Inheritance Problem" [Maurin, 2019]: how can the mind-dependent properties of explanation fail to infect the objective properties of grounding, or conversely, how can an entirely mind-independent relation fulfill cognitive explanatory functions? Traditional realist accounts face a methodological impasse here. To resolve this crisis and salvage metaphysical realism, it is necessary to thoroughly analyze the nature of the link between grounding and explanation.
Structural Conflict; :union:ism vs. Separatism
The core of the debate centers on a conceptual distinction between what determines a fact ontologically and what explains it. Ontic determination, or grounding, is theorized as an objective structural tie in the world itself. Conversely, metaphysical explanation is intuitively understood as a cognitive or communicative activity aimed at generating understanding.
To address the relationship between these two concepts, contemporary metaphysical literature is divided into two overarching frameworks, a terminological distinction highlighted by Michael Raven [Raven, 2015]: ":union:ism," which asserts that grounding is identical to metaphysical explanation, and "Separatism," which maintains that they are distinct entities. When evaluating these frameworks based on their ontological commitments, a complex theoretical landscape emerges, comprising five distinct models.
The theoretical landscape can be categorized into five major approaches based on how they handle the priority and distinction between grounding and explanation:
- Realist Separatism: Defended most robustly by Jonathan Schaffer [Schaffer, 2009; Schaffer, 2016; Schaffer, 2017], this traditional view posits a two-layered structure of reality: a worldly layer and a representational layer. Ontic grounding holds absolute ontological priority as a mind-independent structuring relation. Metaphysical explanation is relegated to a secondary, mind-dependent activity that merely tracks these ontic backing relations. While preserving realism, this model struggles to justify how our mind-dependent explanatory intuitions can serve as reliable guides to discovering the mind-independent structure of reality, leaving the Inheritance Problem unresolved [Maurin, 2019].
- Anti-Realist Separatism: Reversing the priority, this approach [Thompson, 2016; Thompson, 2023] argues that the epistemic act of explanation is fundamental. Grounding is treated as a theoretical construct shaped entirely by our pragmatic and explanatory needs. This view is further developed as "Metaphysical Explanation-First Idealism" by David Mark Kovacs [Kovacs, 2021]. It aligns with broader skepticism about baseless ontological assumptions in physics and metaphysics [Maudlin, 2007] and resonates with the pragmatic, context-dependent tradition of scientific explanation [Van Fraassen, 1980]. However, it collapses into explanatory idealism, defeating the primary purpose of realist metaphysics.
- Realist :union:ism: Represented by the foundational works of Kit Fine [Fine, 2012] and Gideon Rosen [Rosen, 2010], this dominant model claims strict identity: grounding simply is metaphysical explanation (ontic explanation). By equating the two, it guarantees realism but falls victim to severe conceptual ambiguity. It strips the concept of "explanation" of its essential epistemic functions, creating a category mistake that ignores the common-sense, cognitive meaning of the term.
- Explanation-centered :union:ism (Anti-realist leaning): As articulated by Shamik Dasgupta [Dasgupta, 2017], this view maintains the identity thesis but shifts the starting point to our pre-theoretic, everyday mental acts of giving "constitutive" explanations. Grounding is treated merely as a deflationary label applied to these epistemic acts. This structural reversal inherently leans toward anti-realism and skepticism regarding the objective structure of the world.
- Hybrid Separatism: Proposed by Alexander Skiles and Kelly Trogdon [Skiles & Trogdon, 2021], this alternative model rejects the strict priority of either the worldly or the representational layer. It argues that a successful metaphysical explanation requires the interdependence of both an objective worldly condition (a grounding relation) and an epistemic condition (an informative representation).
In Defense of Hybrid Separatism
To resolve the profound conflict between the objective nature of grounding and the subjective features of explanation, "Hybrid Separatism" emerges as the most coherent methodological framework. The critical insight of this model is the systematic distinction it draws between "explanation per se" and "successful explanation" [Skiles & Trogdon, 2021; Thompson, 2023].
Explanation per se is defined objectively as a representational entity (such as a proposition or model) that aims to picture an ontic grounding relation. However, a "successful explanation" is an epistemic act. An explanation only becomes successful when it fulfills both the existential condition (an actual mind-independent grounding relation must exist) and the subjective condition (the representation must be informative and capable of generating understanding). The analytical advantages of this framework include:
- Preserving Objective Grounding: The hybrid view is fundamentally rooted in realism. The necessary condition for any metaphysical explanation to be a candidate for success is the actual presence of an objective grounding relation. Representing non-causal dependencies requires anchoring in objective worldly structures.
- Preserving the Epistemic Nature of Explanation: Unlike realist :union:ism, this view respects subjective intuitions regarding explanation. Mind-dependent features are not discarded; instead, through a concessive "explaining away" strategy (analogous to the methodology discussed by Shamik Dasgupta [Dasgupta, 2014]), they are relocated to their proper place. Subjectivity and the need for a cognitive agent are acknowledged as necessary criteria for evaluating the success of the epistemic act, not as conditions for the existence of the worldly relation.
- Providing a Coherent Definition of Successful Explanation: By defining explanation as a representational entity, this framework avoids category mistakes. Successful explanations are merely a subset of representational entities that have correctly satisfied both worldly and mental constraints.
- Resolving the Category Mistake of :union:ism: If explanation were strictly identical to an ontic relation, the concept of "explanatory success" would be meaningless. By recognizing the representational nature of explanation, Hybrid Separatism accommodates the intuition that explanations are gradable. A representation might successfully generate understanding for a physicist while failing to do so for a layperson.
- Clarifying Terminological Multiplicity: This approach justifies the necessity of two distinct terms. Even if a successful explanation's content maps perfectly onto an external grounding relation, the two remain ontologically distinct. The nature of an event (grounding) is categorically different from the nature of an accurate report of that event (explanation).
- Tracing the "Fact-based" Nature of Relata: The model illuminates why philosophers generally insist that the relata of grounding are "facts" or propositions [Trogdon, 2013]. Because explanation is inherently representational and requires a logical structure to generate understanding, we project this logical requirement onto the world itself. Debates over the structure of grounding are thus inevitably intertwined with our epistemic constraints regarding representation.
Conclusion
The methodological crisis in contemporary metaphysics, epitomized by the Inheritance Problem, is not a reason to abandon metaphysical realism or retreat into explanatory idealism. Instead, it highlights the necessity of refining traditional realist frameworks. Hybrid Separatism provides the analytical path to resolving this problem. By distinguishing between "explanation as a minimal representation" and "explanation as a cognitive act of generating understanding," it prevents the mind-dependent features of explanation from infecting the objective nature of grounding. In this paradigm, the objective world and the human mind are transformed into interdependent partners. Grounding remains the objective determination relation in the world, while metaphysical explanation is elevated to a clear, representational bridge connecting mind-independent metaphysics with human epistemology.
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