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Volume -                   3 , - : 389-404 | Back to browse issues page

‎ 10.58209/jpt.6.3.389

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Internalism and Normative Authority; a Critique of Bernard Williams and Stephen Finlay. 3 https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.6.3.389
URL: http://daneshafarand.org/article-1-87245-en.html
Internalism and Normative Authority; a Critique of Bernard Williams and Stephen Finlay
Abstract:   (133 Views)
Internalism about normative reasons grounds moral normativity in our psychological states by positing a necessary connection between such reasons and an agent’s motivational set. Externalists reject this constraint. A central locus of this dispute concerns the interpretation and evaluation of Bernard Williams’s seminal argument for internalism. Drawing on Stephen Finlay's work, this article first isolates four standard readings of Williams’s argument, introduces Finlay’s distinct interpretation, and then subjects these accounts to critical scrutiny. The discussion then turns to Finlay’s broader theoretical framework. By employing contextualism and an end-relational analysis of moral concepts, Finlay attempts to decouple the "existence" of reasons from their "significance"—seeking to preserve the spirit of internalism within an externalist framework. Ultimately, the paper argues that Finlay’s account falls prey to the same fundamental objection that plagues Williams’s view: it fails to adequately account for morality's normative authority.
 
Keywords: Normative Reasons, Internalism, Normative Authority, Bernard Williams, Stephen Finlay
     
Article Type: Original Research |
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